South Africans voting tomorrow will weigh party promises of better services against years of municipal decay. To uphold their promises, leaders will need to tackle institutional weaknesses, failures in financial controls and accountability, and political incentive structures that feed corruption.
The Institute for Security Studies’ (ISS) Anti-Corruption Tracker Information System (ACTis) can help make this task achievable by providing risk analysis and recommendations for dealing with state corruption. Nine local, three district and eight metropolitan municipalities have been assessed. Records going back three to five years were examined using a powerful AI tool custom-developed by Murmur Intelligence for the ISS.
The early-intervention tracker is built on local and international studies of systemic corruption, and learnings from the Zondo Commission on state capture. It enables ISS to search hundreds of thousands of documents, flag corruption patterns and encourage intervention before public institutions are compromised.
ACTis shows that graft in South Africa’s municipalities is a self-reinforcing system, not a string of unrelated incidents – with variations in scale, complexity and institutional resilience.
Compromised leadership often leads to procurement manipulation and weakened financial controls, resulting in irregular, wasteful and fruitless expenditure. Attempts at accountability are obstructed, enabling corrupt (and potentially criminal) networks of actors and companies to extract value. Poor service delivery and failing infrastructure follow, with South Africans paying the price, sometimes with their lives.
Generally, corruption allegations centre on municipalities’ most senior political and administrative officials. ACTis confirms that graft is often enabled by improper appointments (in 14 of the 20 case studies) and compounded when implicated officials move to new positions in other municipalities or government institutions.
For example, despite unresolved graft charges, two former Beaufort West mayors now serve as Central Karoo District Municipality councillors. At Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality (BCMM), a former chief financial officer (CFO) dismissed for financial misconduct was reappointed as acting CFO, then chief operations officer (COO).
The City of Johannesburg appointed a COO despite her being implicated in a Special Investigating Unit (SIU) probe into irregular COVID-19 contracts and a building fire inquiry that recommended disciplinary action against her. She was ultimately removed from office.
Leadership instability can be both a cause and symptom of corruption. Leadership churn can deliberately weaken financial controls, obstruct accountability and create windows for graft. Leaders can also foster a climate of fear or favour, where organisational culture punishes speaking out, favours compliance, or protects those implicated in graft (evident in seven municipalities, with seven showing early signs).
ACTis found evidence of corrupt tender awards in five of the 20 municipalities; another 11 showed indications that contracts may be repeatedly and irregularly awarded to the same contractors or use the same modus operandi. Procurement is often the ‘entry point’ for misusing public funds, with five tactics commonly employed.
First, tailoring specifications to favour predetermined bidders. Polokwane Local Municipality completed the bid requirements for Mankweng’s stadium only after advertising the tender. Second, inflating contracts and manipulating project scopes. BCMM’s Mdantsane NU2 swimming pool upgrade escalated from R22 million to R71 million. It remains incomplete.
Third, using emergency provisions and deviations to bypass competitive processes. KwaDukuza Local Municipality awarded several irregular contracts in 2023 after receiving R1.2 billion in disaster relief grants following severe floods. Fourth, paying companies despite incomplete or non-existent work, and fifth, awarding contracts to fronted or connected companies, as reportedly happened with Tshwane’s deputy mayor.
Municipalities’ financial controls shape their vulnerability to corruption. ACTis identified systemic malpractice in 17 of the 20 municipalities. Weak financial management is directly linked to billions in irregular expenditure. Misleading reporting hides poor performance and irregular transactions, and inadequate controls lead to revenue-collection failures, cash-flow crises and unmaintained infrastructure.
With internal accountability mechanisms often compromised, external oversight and interventions have become more frequent. South Africa’s Auditor-General consistently identifies uninvestigated irregular expenditure, delayed or non-existent disciplinary procedures and ignored audit action plans.
Similarly, the SIU, Public Protector, Public Service Commission, Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI), Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs Department and public inquiries institute investigations that produce detailed findings.
The Madlanga Commission has affected municipalities like Ekurhuleni and Tshwane, with swift consequences for some senior officials. However, implicated officials often stay in their posts, move to other public institutions or receive non-punitive sanctions.
ACTis found that nine municipalities were trying to obstruct accountability (with early signs in another five), ranging from non-compliance to preventing oversight. BCMM officials withheld a forensic investigation report from the SIU and Parliament’s Standing Committee on Public Accounts for over a year. Polokwane officials filed court applications to set aside a DPCI subpoena and prevent the release of documents.
Investigative media and civil society help expose misconduct and push for change. However, metros receive significantly more attention than local or district municipalities, enabling graft by delaying detection, limiting whistleblowers’ access to platforms and protections, and keeping national political attention sporadic.
Identifiable networks linking public officials to private beneficiaries of municipal resources are particularly concerning. Local municipality networks tend to be relatively simple and centred on one or two officials linked to a single set of beneficiaries. Metros often have more networks, operating at a more sophisticated level.
ACTis found evidence of these networks in six of the eight entities. The clearest is in Tshwane, where officials directed tenders to preferred bidders, and multiple actors were involved in manipulating tender design and evaluation. Political protection ensured the network’s smooth operation.
Fixing municipalities requires systemic solutions. While each case needs a tailored response, general recommendations include reviewing leadership appointments, implementing audit corrections, investigating suspected wrongdoing, imposing appropriate consequences, and using external oversight to verify progress and escalate when reforms fail.
Corruption is not inevitable. Our sample shows that Midvaal, Swartland and Ehlanzeni are clean, resilient municipalities. It can be stopped if warning signs are identified and addressed early, and accountability functions every day, not only ahead of elections.
Those elected tomorrow – and the administrators they appoint – should take lessons from ACTis’ analysis to begin addressing corruption fault lines and rebuilding public trust.
Romi Sigsworth, Researcher and Editor, Anti-Corruption Tracker information system (ACTis), ISS, Nicky Prins, Project Leader, Anti-Corruption Tracker information system (ACTis) and ISS Florencia Belvedere, Project Manager, Anti-Corruption Tracker information system (ACTis), ISS
Image: Sharon Seretlo/Gallo Images via Getty Images
